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Abstract
We provide two new indices of efficiency for determining the degree of coherence in an
agent’s consumption decisions. We analyze to which extent they improve the efficiency
displayed by Varian’s [16] index. We report on the results of a Montecarlo experiment
that confirms that strict improvements of Varian’s vector-index appear on a regular basis.
1. Introduction
In the theory of consumer behavior many non-parametric tests are designed to check
for an agent’s optimizing behavior without any functional restriction on the demand.
For finite sets of data, Afriat [1] and Varian [15] outstand among a large literature.
After Afriat-Varian it is known that violations of the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) mean violations of the usual neoclassical model of demand choice.
In experimental economics this has permitted to find contradictions to the standard
demand model (cf., e.g., Battalio et. al. [3], Koo [9], Sippel [12], and Mattei [10, 11]).
Nonetheless, apart from intrinsic lack of rationality many other factors may be a cause for
inconsistency with the exact optimizing model: measurement errors, non-observability of
all consumption choices, rationing in the available quantities, time-evolving preferences,
.... Afriat’s [2] seminal contribution investigates the degree of coherence in a finite list
of demand observations. by using a uniform bound for goodness-of-fit of the agent’s
behavior. Varian [16] proposes the use of vector-indices instead, a line followed by e.g.,
Famulari [6], Gross [7], Swofford and Withney [13] among others.
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In this work we provide two new vector-indices of efficiency that allow to determine the
degree of coherence in an agent’s consumption decisions. Our construction is algorith-
mic and computationally efficient. These indices improve the performance of Varian’s
[16] index (further studied by Tsur [14]), in the following sense. Comparing uniform
bounds is trivial: the higher, the closer to rational. Comparing vector-indices can be
done through norms as proposed by Varian, but the choice of the norm can produce
different conclusions. Here we take a more basic and less arguable position: we request
that for all sets of data our vector-indices provide Pareto-improvements of Varian’s, that
improvement being strict for a non-negligible part of the problems. We perform a Mon-
tecarlo experiment to check how Tsur’s test performs against our proposals, confirming
that strict improvements of Varian’s vector-index appear on a regular basis.
We organize our research as follows. In Section 2 we fix the notation and comment
on the literature briefly. Section 3 gives our main results, and Section 4 reports on the
conclusions from our Montecarlo experiment. Section 5 contains the proofs of our results.
2. Definitions and preliminary results
The pure theory of consumer’s behavior aims at studying the structure of choices among
bundles of goods by a rational agent, when he faces different price-income situations.
We fix k > 0 goods. The agent can select non-negative amounts of every good. A
demand vector x¯ = (x1, · · · , xk) is a k-dimensional vector whose i-th component cap-
tures the amount of good i that the agent demands. Market prices are captured by
p¯ = (p1, · · · , pk). Henceforth we assume that all prices are positive (we discard freely
available goods from the analysis), that is, p¯ ∈ Rk++.
We fix a finite set of demand data, namely {(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1. Each (p¯t, x¯t) ∈ Rk++ × Rk+
means that x¯t has been demanded at normalized prices p¯t, thus p¯tx¯t = 1 throughout.
The possible rationality of this series of observations relates to the fulfilment of behavioral
postulates that are typically expressed in terms of the following concepts.
Definition 1. The consumer directly reveals that prefers x¯t to x¯s, denoted x¯t R
0 x¯s,
if p¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯s. He reveals that prefers x¯t to x¯s, denoted x¯t R x¯s, if for some suitable
bundles we have x¯t R
0 x¯t1 · · · R0 x¯tk R0 x¯s.
The following postulate is necessary and sufficient for our list of demand observations to
be generated by an agent through optimization of a non-satiated, continuous, concave
and monotone utility (cf., Varian [15]):
Definition 2. The set of consumption data {(pt, xt)}nt=1 agrees with the Generalized
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Axiom of Revealed Preference (also GARP) if for each pair of observations i, j such
that xiRxj one has pjxj 6 pjxi.
GARP is an exact test of the rationality of demand choices. As has been mentioned,
experimental studies confirm that relevant series of data do not pass such test. Does
this mean that the data must be considered as fully irrational? It is agreed that the
answer is no, and thus different models attempt to account for some inaccuracies in the
specification of the observations that permit to fit the data into approximate rationality.
In the non-parametric approach that we follow in this paper the analyst keeps control of
the inefficiency of the agent as an optimizer by introducing either a global parameter for
the problem (namely, a number 0 6 e 6 1 ), or a vector-index of efficiency e¯ = (et)nt=1
(with 0 6 et 6 1, ∀t ). In the latter, richer instance, each ej is interpreted as the “level
of efficiency” of the agent in the j-th budget situation. Afriat’s [2, pp. 467-8] index 1
belongs to the first class, while Varian’s [16] proposal i belongs to the second one. A
formal definition of revelation subject to a vector-index follows:
Definition 3. An index-mapping ξ is a procedure that with each series of m demand
observations assigns a vector-index ξ¯ = (ξ1, . . . , ξm), 0 6 ξt 6 1 ∀t . Formally speaking:
ξ({(q¯t, y¯t)}mt=1) = ξ¯ = (ξ1, . . . , ξm), for each {(q¯t, y¯t)}mt=1.
Given e¯ = (et)
n
t=1 with 0 6 et 6 1 ∀t , we say that the consumer directly reveals under
the vector-index e¯ that prefers x¯t to x¯s, denoted x¯t R
0(e¯) x¯s, if etp¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯s. He
reveals under the vector-index e¯ that prefers x¯t to x¯s, denoted x¯t R(e¯) x¯s, if there are
x¯t1 , . . . , x¯tk such that x¯t R
0(e¯) x¯t1 · · · R0(e¯) x¯tk R0(e¯) x¯s.
From the point of view of intuition, Varian [16] explains that if for example et = 0.9 we
only count bundles x¯s whose cost is less than 90% of the price paid for x¯t as candidates
for being revealed “worse” than choice x¯t. It is intuitively clear that this imposes less
restrictions on the conditions for optimization that must be verified 2 and therefore yields
a non-exact concept of rationality in the form of the next postulate (cf., [16]):
Definition 4. The demand data {(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1 agree with the Generalized Axiom of Re-
vealed Preference under e¯, henceforth GARP (e¯), if for each pair of observations t, s it
is true that x¯t R(e¯) x¯s entails etp¯tx¯t 6 p¯tx¯s.
1It represents the minimal percentage of money (in unit terms) that the agent can waste in every
decision so that the data fit the standard optimization model. Thus its main drawback is that it does
not inform of which observations cause the possible lack of consistency. It is worth mentioning that
Houtmann and Maks [8] propose an efficient algorithm to compute Afriat’s index that is based on the
bisection method.
2Formally: if we let 0¯ = (0, . . . , 0) and 1¯ = (1, . . . , 1) then for every vector e¯ ∈ [0¯, 1¯] the relations
R0(e¯) ⊆ R0(1¯) = R0 and R(e¯) ⊆ R(1¯) = R must hold true.
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For our purposes only index-mappings that perform well with respect to such approxi-
mately rational behavior are worth studying. This can be achieved in two related senses.
Definition 5. The index-mapping ξ is efficient (resp., strongly efficient) if for each
finite set of data {(q¯t, y¯t)}mt=1 with associated ξ¯ = ξ({(q¯t, y¯t)}mt=1) the following holds 3:
{(q¯t, y¯t)}mt=1 verifies GARP (ζ¯), ∀ ζ¯ ∈ Cm with ζ¯  ξ¯ (resp., with ζ¯ 6 ξ¯)
We intend to build on Varian’s proposal i. This is axiomatically based on Samuelson’s
overcompensation function, which yields interesting economic insights. We do not need
such interpretation here, but rather its alternative algorithmic construction 4:
Algorithm 1. Pseudo-code for computing Varian’s index
Input: Cost matrix associated with{(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1
1. begin
2. for j := 1 to n do e(j)← 1
3. for i, j := 1 to n if C(i, i) > C(i, j) then R0(i, j) ← 1 else R0(i, j) ←
0
4. Compute the transitive closure R of R0 and check for GARP
5. if {(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1 does not agree with GARP then
for j := 1 to n do e(j)← min
{
C(j,i)
C(j,j)
: x¯iRx¯j
}
6. return
Output: i¯ = i({(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1)
It is trivial that strong efficiency implies efficiency. The converse implication does not
hold: Afriat’s index-mapping is efficient but not strongly efficient 5. Varian’s index-
mapping is strongly efficient. In what follows all index-mapping are at least efficient.
For series of demand observations that do not agree with the exact optimizing model,
Varian proposed to use the Euclidean norm of 1− i¯ as a measure of the goodness-of-fit of
the data with such standard model. He argued that there is a positive correlation between
the degree of coherence in the decisions and ‖¯i‖. Alternatively, in order to compare the
3By Cm we mean the unit m-cube. Also, (a1, ..., am)  (b1, ..., bm) means ai < bi for each i, and
(a1, ..., am) < (b1, ..., bm) means ai 6 bi for each i but (a1, ..., am) 6= (b1, ..., bm).
4For any {(q¯t, y¯t)}mt=1, its cost matrix is C = (cij)i,j6m defined by cij = q¯iy¯j for each i, j.
5Consider the following counterexample: x¯1 = (8, 1, 8), x¯2 = (5, 5, 6), x¯3 = (5, 6, 5), x¯4 = (8, 8, 1),
for respective prices p¯1 = (1, 1, 0.5), p¯2 = (1, 1, 1.5), p¯3 = (1, 0.5, 1), p¯4 = (1, 2, 2). Afriat’s index is
e¯∗ = (1, 1, 1, 1) and because the data violate GARP we can not have strong efficiency.
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performance of different index-mappings with regard to efficiency we introduce Definition
6 below (implications as to comparing in Varian’s sense are straightforward).
Definition 6. Let ξ and ζ be index-mappings. We say that ξ
1. describes the demand behavior quasi-better than ζ if for each D = {(q¯t, y¯t)}mt=1 it
is true that ξ(D) > ζ(D) and at least for one such case the inequality is strict.
2. describes the demand behavior better than ζ if for each D = {(q¯t, y¯t)}mt=1 it is true
that ξ(D) > ζ(D).
3. Main theoretical results
Next we put forward two strongly efficient index-mappings that describe the behavior
of an agent quasi-better than Varian’s index-mapping (proofs are given in Section 5).
They are defined algorithmically and yield the output in polinomial time.
Definition 7 (IM1). Let {(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1 be demand data and {υ¯k}n−1k=0 the family of n-
vectors υ¯k = (υk1, · · · , υkn) ∈ IRn++ associated with it through the following recurrent
equation 6 initialized at υ¯0 = (1, · · · , 1): υ¯k = υ¯k−1  υ¯∗k , where υ¯∗k = (υ∗k1, · · · , υ∗kn)
is a vector in IRn++ such that υ
∗
kt = max
{
p¯tx¯s
υtk−1p¯tx¯t
< 1 : x¯sR(υ¯k−1)x¯t
}
if x¯t violates
GARP (υ¯k−1) and υ∗kt = 1 otherwise.
We denote by υ¯ the vector-index υ¯ = (υ1, · · · , υn) ∈ IRn++ such that υt = υ(n−1)t for
each observation t.
Algorithm 2. Pseudo-code for computing IM1
1. begin
2. for i, j := 1 to n do v(j)← 1; Cv(i, j)← C(i, j)
3. While [ {(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1 does not verify GARP (v) ]
4. for j := 1 to n do Cv(j, j)← C(j, j); Cv(j, j)← v(j) · C(j, j)
5. for i, j := 1 to n if Cv(i, i) > Cv(i, j) then R0v(i, j) ← 1 else
R0v(i, j)← 0
6. Compute the transitive closure Rv of the relation R
0
v
7. for j := 1 to n do Gv(x¯j)← {x¯i : x¯iRvx¯j and Cv(j, j) > Cv(j, i)}
8. for j := 1 to n if Gv(x¯j) 6= ∅ then
v(j)← v(j) ·max
{
C(j,i)
C(j,j)
< 1 : x¯i ∈ Gv(x¯j)
}
9. return
6If v¯, w¯ ∈ IRn, we denote z¯ = v¯  w¯ ∈ IRn when zt = vt · wt for each t.
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In order to define our second index-mapping we need an auxiliary definition. With
{(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1 and a family {ξ¯k}k∈I of n-vectors ξ¯k = (ξk1, · · · , ξkn) ∈ IRn++ we define
the family {ζ¯k}k∈I of n-vectors ζ¯k = (ζk1, · · · , ζkn) ∈ IRn++ associated with {ξ¯k}k∈I
through: ζkt = max
{
p¯tx¯s
ξtk−1p¯tx¯t
< 1 : x¯sR(ξ¯k−1)x¯t
}
if x¯t violates GARP (ξ¯k−1) and ζkt =
1 otherwise.
Definition 8 (IM2). Let {(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1 be demand data and let {ϑ¯k}n
2−n
k=1 be a family
of n-vectors ϑ¯k = (ϑk1, · · · , ϑkn) ∈ IRn++ obtained by the following recurrent equation
initialized at ϑ¯1 = (1, · · · , 1): ϑ¯k+1 = ϑ¯k ϑ¯∗k, where {ζ¯k}n
2−n
k=1 is the family of n-vectors
associated with {ϑ¯k}n2−nk=1 and ϑ¯∗k = (ϑ∗k1, · · · , ϑ∗kn) ∈ IRn++ is such that ϑ∗kt = ζkt if x¯t
is not consistent with GARP (ϑ¯k−1), ζkt = ζ∗k and 6∃ x¯s con s < t such that ζks = ζ∗k ,
where ζ∗k = max{ζks : ζks < 1} and ϑ∗kt = 1, otherwise.
We denote by ϑ¯ the vector-index ϑ¯ = (ϑ1, · · · , ϑn) ∈ IRn++ such that ϑt = ϑn(n−1)t for
each observation t.
Algorithm 3. Pseudo-code for computing IM2
1. begin
2. for i, j := 1 to n do ϑ(j)← 1; Cϑ(i, j)← C(i, j)
3. While [ {(p¯t, x¯t)}nt=1 does not verify GARP (ϑ) ]
4. for j := 1 to n do Cϑ(j, j)← C(j, j); Cϑ(j, j)← ϑ(j) · C(j, j)
5. for i, j := 1 to n if Cϑ(i, i) > Cϑ(i, j) then R0ϑ(i, j) ← 1 else
R0ϑ(i, j)← 0
6. Compute the transitive closure Rϑ of the relation R
0
ϑ
7. for j := 1 to n do Gϑ(x¯j)← {x¯i : x¯iRϑx¯j and Cϑ(j, j) > Cϑ(j, i)}
8. for j := 1 to n if Gϑ(x¯j) 6= ∅ then
Pert∗(j)← max
{
C(j,i)
C(j,j)
< 1 : x¯i ∈ Gϑ(x¯j)
}
9. v∗ ← max{Pert∗(j) : Gϑ(x¯j) 6= ∅};
ω∗ ← min{j : x¯j ∈ Gϑ(x¯j) : Pert∗(j) = v∗}
10. for j := 1 to n if (Gϑ(x¯j) 6= ∅;Pert∗(j) = v∗; j = ω∗) then
ϑ(j)← v∗ · ϑ(j)
11. return
Example 1. Let us consider the demand data with the following cost matrix: 1.00 1.25 0.91 1.500.67 1.00 0.85 0.950.60 0.80 1.00 1.25
0.40 0.70 0.75 1.00

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It can be checked that Varian’s index is (0.91, 0.67, 0.6, 0.4), IM1 is (0.91, 0.85, 0.6, 0.7)
and IM2 is (0.91, 0.67, 0.6, 1).
The respective cost matrices associated with IM1 and IM2 are the following:
0.91 1.25 0.91 1.50
0.67 0.85 0.85 0.95
0.60 0.80 0.60 1.25
0.40 0.70 0.75 0.70


0.91 1.25 0.91 1.50
0.67 0.67 0.85 0.95
0.60 0.80 0.60 1.25
0.40 0.70 0.75 1.00

By using the standard representation of binary relations by oriented graphs, we can visu-
alize this information as in Figure 1. Here the transition cost from vertex (observation)
i to vertex j is cij − cii when this amount is lesser or equal than 0. Observe that orig-
inally there were cycles of negative length, which can not appear under the respective
vector-indices because they stem from strongly efficient index-mappings.
x¯1
0.0 
−0.09
**
x¯2−0.33oo
0.0
−0.15

−0.05
ttx¯4
−0.6
OO
−0.3
44
0.0
LL −0.25 // x¯3
−0.2
YY
0.0
RR
−0.4
jj x¯1
0.0
**
x¯20.0oo
x¯4
0.0
OO
x¯3
0.0
jj x¯1
0.0
**
x¯2−0.18oo
0.0

x¯4
−0.3
OO
0.0
44
x¯3
0.0
jj x¯1
0.0
**
x¯20.0oo
x¯4
−0.6
OO
−0.3
44
0.0
LL −0.25 // x¯3
0.0
jj
(1, 1, 1, 1) (0.91, 0.67, 0.6, 0.4) (0.91, 0.85, 0.6, 0.7) (0.91, 0.67, 0.6, 1)
Figure 1: A representation of the respective relations R0, R0(¯i), R0(υ¯), R0(ϑ¯)
4. Montecarlo experiment
Next we run a Montecarlo experiment in order to analyze the goodness-of-fit of the
optimizing model as well as the statistical significance of the violations of GARP. We
generate the data using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model by Deaton and
Muellbauer [4, 5]. We introduce perturbations both in prices and demanded amounts
through random variables with a normal logarithmic distribution. Our series of data
have n = 20 observations with k = 8 goods.
Table 1 summarizes the results of our Montecarlo experiment. In all cases GARP is
violated and ϑ¯ > i¯ , although we must point out that examples are known where both
indices coincide, and the inequality υ¯ > i¯ holds in 99.966% of the simulations. This
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information complements the main theoretical results about comparisons of the different
indices. The proportion of simulations where IM2 is “better” than IM1, in the sense of
Definition 6, is 1.82%, while the remaining cases end up in incomparability: 98.18% of
the cases yield ϑ¯ 6> υ¯ and υ¯ 6> ϑ¯ .
Number of simulations: 4500 (20 demand observations of 8 components)
Average Afriat index: 0.562
Percentage simulations violating GARP: 100.00%
Percentage simulations with ϑ¯ > v¯: 1.82%
Percentage simulations with ϑ¯ 6> v¯ ∧ υ¯ 6> ϑ¯: 98.18%
Index Euclidean Norm Percentage of simulations with
(Average) ||ξ¯|| > ||¯i||
υ¯ 3.421927808 99.966%
ϑ¯ 3.721796885 100.00%
Table 1: Results of the Montecarlo experiment.
Another fact that must be stressed concerns the statistical significance of the violations of
GARP. Our experiment produced 4 cases where Tsur’s test concludes that such violation
is structural while our indices do not concur to this rejection of rationality at suitable
levels, but rather small random perturbations explain such apparent irrationality.
5. Appendix: proofs
Given {(p¯1, x¯1), ..., (p¯n, x¯n)} arbitrary demand data, we say that x¯t is strongly incon-
sistent with GARP if there is x¯s such that x¯sRx¯t and p¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯s. In terms of the
description given in Example 1: x¯t lies in a cycle of negative length where the transition
cost from it is strictly negative.
IM1 is strongly efficient: Take {(p¯1, x¯1), ..., (p¯n, x¯n)} arbitrary demand data that are
inconsistent with GARP. We need to prove that its associated υ¯ verifies GARP (υ¯) By
absurdum, assume that there are bundles x¯t and x¯tj such that x¯tjR(υ¯)x¯t and vtp¯tx¯t >
p¯tx¯tj . Since x¯t is strongly inconsistent with GARP there are x¯t1 , · · · , x¯trt , 1 6 rt 6 n−1
such that x¯tiRx¯t and p¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯ti for each 1 6 i 6 rt. Without loss of generality we can
reorder the prior demanded bundles in such way that p¯tx¯ti > p¯tx¯ti+1 for 1 6 i 6 rt − 1.
Besides, when k > 1 the definition of {υ¯k}n−1k=0 entails υ¯k > v¯, thus x¯tjR(υ¯k)x¯t and
υktp¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯tj . In particular, x¯tjR(v¯h)x¯t and υhtp¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯tj for all h 6 j. From this
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we deduce υjt =
p¯tx¯jt
p¯tx¯t
. Furthermore, υ¯j > υ¯ implies υjtp¯tx¯t > υtp¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯tj , hence
p¯tx¯tj > υtp¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯tj , which in turn implies p¯tx¯tj > p¯tx¯tj , an absurd conclusion that
proves the claim.
IM2 is strongly efficient: Take {(p¯1, x¯1), ..., (p¯n, x¯n)} arbitrary demand data that are
inconsistent with GARP. We need to prove that its associated ϑ¯ verifies GARP (ϑ¯).
By absurdum, assume that there are bundles x¯t and x¯tj such that x¯tjR(ϑ¯)x¯t and
ϑtp¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯tj . The fact that R(ϑ¯) is a subrelation of R entails that x¯t is strongly
inconsistent with GARP thus there are x¯t1 , · · · , x¯trt , rt > 1 with x¯tiRx¯t and p¯tx¯t >
p¯tx¯ti , ∀i = 1, · · · , rt. Without loss of generality we can assume that p¯tx¯ti > p¯tx¯ti+1
∀ i = 1, · · · , rt−1. Besides, for all k > 1 the definition of {ϑ¯k}n2−nk=1 yields ϑ¯k > ϑ¯, which
implies x¯tjR(ϑ¯k)x¯t because R(ϑ¯) is a subrelation of R(ϑ¯k), and furthermore ϑktp¯tx¯t >
ϑtp¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯tj , which in turn yields the existence of kj > 1 such that ϑkjt =
p¯tx¯tj
p¯tx¯t
.
Further, ϑ¯kj > ϑ¯ implies ϑkjtp¯tx¯t > ϑtp¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯tj , therefore p¯tx¯tj > ϑtp¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯tj and
p¯tx¯tj > p¯tx¯tj , which is absurd. This proves the claim.
IM1 describes the demand behavior quasi-better than Varian’s index-mapping:
In view of Example 1 we only need to check that υ¯ = υ¯D > i¯D = i¯ –we drop subindices
for convenience– for every finite list of demand observation D = {(p¯1, x¯1), ..., (p¯n, x¯n)}
that is inconsistent with GARP.
For every fixed bundle x¯t, if it is not strongly inconsistent with GARP, i.e., if @ x¯s
such that x¯sRx¯t and p¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯s, then it = υt = 1 by construction. If x¯t is strongly
inconsistent with GARP there exist x¯t1 , · · · , x¯trt , rt > 1, such that x¯tiRx¯t and p¯tx¯t >
p¯tx¯ti , ∀i = 1, · · · , rt. We do not lose generality by ordering its precedent bundles
in such way that p¯tx¯ti > p¯tx¯ti+1 , ∀ i = 1, · · · , rt − 1. Suppose that x¯t is strongly
inconsistent with GARP (υ¯k) for every k = 1, · · · , rt− 1 , and also that x¯t is consistent
with GARP (υ¯rt). Then υk′t = υrtt, ∀ k′ = rt, · · · , n − 1, thus υt = υrtt. Besides, as
υkt = max
{
p¯tx¯s
p¯tx¯tυk−1t
< 1 : x¯sR(υ¯k−1t)x¯t
}
, ∀ k = 1, · · · , rt the following equality holds:
υt = υrtt =
∏rt
i=1 p¯tx¯ti∏rt−1
i=1 p¯tx¯i
· 1
p¯tx¯t
=
p¯tx¯trt
p¯tx¯t
= it
If there is k ∈ IN ( k 6 rt − 1 ) such that x¯t violates GARP (υ¯h) for every h < k and
x¯t is consistent with GARP (υ¯k), then
υt = υkt =
∏k
i=1 p¯tx¯ti∏k−1
i=1 p¯tx¯i
· 1
p¯tx¯t
=⇒ υkt = it ·
∏rt−1
i=k p¯tx¯i∏rt
i=k+1 p¯tx¯ti
= it · p¯tx¯k
p¯tx¯rt
> it
Consequently, for every t the inequality υt > it holds true.
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IM2 describes the demand behavior quasi-better than Varian’s index-mapping:
In view of Example 1 we only need to check that ϑ¯ = ϑ¯D > i¯D = i¯ –we drop subindices
for convenience– for every finite list of demand observation D = {(p¯1, x¯1), ..., (p¯n, x¯n)}
that is inconsistent with GARP.
For any bundle x¯t we denote by RI(x¯t) the set formed by all the demanded bundles
x¯s such that x¯sRx¯t and p¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯s. Observe that for a given x¯t, if it is not strongly
inconsistent with GARP, that is, if RI(x¯t) = ∅, by construction one has ϑt = it.
Therefore in order to prove the claim it suffices to check ϑt > it for every x¯t that is
strongly inconsistent with GARP. For one such bundle, there are x¯t1 , · · · , x¯trt , rt > 1,
such that x¯tiRx¯t and p¯tx¯t > p¯tx¯ti , ∀i = 1, · · · , rt. We do not lose generality by
ordering its precedent bundles in such way that p¯tx¯ti > p¯tx¯ti+1 , ∀ i = 1, · · · , rt − 1. Let
k∗ =
∑n
t=1 ]RI(x¯t), then for every x¯t and k > k
∗ with k∗ < k 6 n(n − 1) one must
have ϑkt = ϑk∗t thus ϑt = ϑk∗t. If x¯t is strongly inconsistent with GARP (ϑ¯k) for every
k < k∗, then
ϑk∗t = ϑt =
∏k∗
h=1 ϑht∏k∗−1
h=1 ϑht
=
∏rt
i=1 p¯tx¯ti∏rt−1
i=1 p¯tx¯i
· 1
p¯tx¯t
=
p¯tx¯trt
p¯tx¯t
= it
Otherwise, there is k˜ < k∗ such that x¯t is strongly inconsistent with GARP (ϑ¯h)
∀h < k˜ and x¯t verifies GARP (ϑ¯k˜), thus
ϑt = ϑk˜t =
∏k˜
h=1 ϑht∏k˜−1
h=1 ϑht
=⇒ ϑk˜t = it ·
∏k∗−1
h=k˜
ϑht∏k∗
h=k˜+1 ϑht
Furthermore, because ϑ¯h 6 ϑ¯k for every h > k, one has
∏k∗−1
h=k˜
ϑht >
∏k∗
h=k˜+1 ϑht, which
yields ϑk˜t > it and thus ϑt > it for each t.
Acknowledgements
Jose´ C. R. Alcantud gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Spanish Ministerio
de Ciencia e Innovacio´n under Project ECO2009-07682, and by Consejer´ıa de Educacio´n
de la Junta de Castilla y Leo´n under Project SA024A08. Carlos R. Palmero gratefully
acknowledges financial support by Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacio´n under Project
ECON2009-10231, and by Consejer´ıa de Educacio´n de la Junta de Castilla y Leo´n under
Project VA081A07.
10
References
[1] Afriat, S.N. (1967) The construction of utility functions from expenditure data.
International Economic Review, 8(1), 67-77.
[2] Afriat, S.N. (1973) On a system of inequalities in demand analysis: An extension
of the classical method. International Economic Review 14(2), 460-472.
[3] Battalio, R.C., Kagel, J.H., Winkler, R.C., Fisher, E.C. Jr., Basmann, R.L. &
Krasner, L. (1973) A test of consumer demand theory using observations of indi-
vidual consumer purchases. Western Economic Journal XI, 411-428.
[4] Deaton, A. & Muellbauer, J. (1980) An Almost Ideal Demand System. American
Economic Review, 70(3), 312-336.
[5] Deaton, A. & Muellbauer, J. (1980) Economics and Consumer Behavior. Cam-
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
[6] Famulari, M. (1995) A household-based, nonparametric test of demand theory. The
Review of Economics and Statistics 77, 372-382.
[7] Gross, J. (1991) On expenditure indices in revealed preference tests. Journal of
Political Economy, 98, 416-419.
[8] Houtman, M. & Maks, J.A. (1985) Determining all maximal data subsets consistent
with revealed preference. Kwantitatieve Methoden, 19, 89-104.
[9] Koo, A. (1963) An empirical test of revealed preference theory. Econometrica,
31(4), 646-664.
[10] Mattei, A. (1994) La coherence des choix des consommateurs suisses. Revue Suisse
d’Economie Politique et de Statistique, 130, 3-20.
[11] Mattei, A. (2000) Full-scale real tests of consumer behavior using experimental
data. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 43, 487-497.
[12] Sippel, R. (1997) An experiment on the pure theory of consumer’s Behaviour. The
Economic Journal, 107, 1431-44.
[13] Swofford, J. & Whitney, G. (1987) Nonparametric tests of utility maximization
and weak separability for consumption, leisure and money. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 69(3), 458-64.
[14] Tsur, Y. (1989) On testing for revealed preference conditions. Economics Letters,
31, 359-362.
[15] Varian, H. (1982) The nonparametric approach to demand analysis. Econometrica,
50(4), 945-971.
[16] Varian, H. (1990) Goodness-of-fit in optimizing models. Journal of Econometrics,
46, 125-140.
[17] Varian, H. (1993) Goodness-of-fit for revealed preference tests. CREST Working
Paper. Department of Economics. University of Michigan.
11
